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Abstract
The public frequently appear to overlook privacy, even when they claim to value
it. This disparity between concern and behavior is known as the Privacy Para-
dox. Smartwatches are novel products that offer helpful functionality. However,
although they often store sensitive data (e.g. text messages), owners rarely use
protective features (e.g. app permissions). Campaigns have sought to increase
privacy awareness, but initiatives tend to be ineffective. We therefore explore the
efficacy of a serious game in encouraging protective smartwatch behavior. The
application is designed with Learning Science principles and evaluated through a
study with 504 smartwatch owners. After soliciting concerns and behavior, our
treatment group [n = 252] play the online simulation. Our control group do not
participate [n = 252], as we seek to limit extraneous variables. In a follow-up ses-
sion, all users report posttest responses and qualitative justifications. We appear
to encourage protective behavior, with our treatment group using privacy features
more often. We also significantly reduce the prevalence of the Paradox, realign-
ing behavior with concern. These quantitative findings are complemented by an
inductive analysis of user rationale. Smartwatch behavior is influenced by several
factors, including privacy awareness and data sensitivity. Finally, we use Protec-
tion Motivation Theory (PMT) to develop intervention recommendations. These
include risk exposure tools and protective demonstrations. To our knowledge, this
is the first tool to encourage protective smartwatch behavior.
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1. Introduction
The public claim concern for their privacy, as expressed through a range of
polls and surveys (Pike et al., 2017; Morar Consulting, 2016; Rainie et al., 2013).
However, we often exhibit behavior considered in tension with the principle (Felt,
Ha, Egelman, Haney, Chin and Wagner, 2012). This disparity between concern
and behavior has been labeled the Privacy Paradox (Barnes, 2006). The issue
can occur for several reasons, including lack of awareness (Deuker, 2009), social
norms (Phelan et al., 2016) and hyperbolic discounting (Kokolakis, 2017). Such
disparities can place users at risk, as they may not recognize (or be able to prevent)
the threats that they face (Deuker, 2009).
The Internet-of-Things (IoT) is expanding rapidly, populating our world with
connected devices. But many of these exciting products, including voice assis-
tants (Ford and Palmer, 2018), smart TVs (Ghiglieri et al., 2017) and wearables
(Lee et al., 2016), can pose privacy risks. Smartwatches offer clear convenience
benefits through storing messages, contacts and location data (Do et al., 2017).
However, users rarely apply protection (Udoh and Alkharashi, 2016), placing their
personal information under threat (Dai et al., 2016). This has led to the Paradox
becoming prevalent in smartwatch environments (Williams et al., 2017). As these
devices continue to proliferate, can we align behavior with privacy concerns?
Deuker (2009) believed the Paradox could be mitigated through awareness, as
did Pötzsch (2009) in her design requirements. Furthermore, when asked to justify
the Paradox, users frequently cite a lack of understanding (Williams et al., 2017).
However, highlighting an issue is not sufficient to change behavior (Bada et al.,
2015). In addition to awareness and education, individuals must be encouraged
to adjust their actions (Dolan et al., 2010). Serious games offer greater promise,
since they embed incentives within an engaging environment (Connolly et al.,
2012). Furthermore, studies suggest that such apps can aid retention more than
conventional instruction methods (Wouters et al., 2013). Since privacy games
have proved successful (Barnard-Wills and Ashenden, 2015; Raynes-Goldie and
Allen, 2014), we explore their influence in a smartwatch environment.
We seek to encourage the use of smartwatch privacy features, such as app per-
missions and screen locks. To achieve this, we constructed an online game for
wearable behavior change. This approach supported a large-sample evaluation
(with smartwatch users), and such simulations are common in top-tier privacy re-
search (Rajivan and Camp, 2016; Wang et al., 2015; Kelley et al., 2013; Jackson
and Wang, 2018). The app was carefully designed with principles from Human-
Computer Interaction (HCI) and Learning Science (Quinn, 2005; Annetta, 2010).
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Players were then tasked to solve smartwatch privacy challenges, such as restrict-
ing the permissions of invasive apps. Through learning and practicing protective
techniques, they could refine new skills. To ascertain the influence of the game, we
conducted a pretest-posttest study with real smartwatch owners [n = 504]. Partici-
pants disclosed their concerns and behavior, before being divided into control and
treatment groups. They then gave updated responses one week after the gameplay
session. We studied behavior frequency, assessing how consistently a protective
feature (e.g. screen lock) was used.
Protection became significantly more frequent in the treatment group, sug-
gesting privacy games might encourage action. This is our primary contribution,
since behavior change is a challenging endeavour. The Paradox also became sig-
nificantly less prevalent, while our control group did not differ in either case. We
then sought to dissect privacy rationale: the reasoning behind individuals’ pri-
vacy decision-making. These justifications were analysed through a rich process
of inductive analysis. Several factors appeared to influence behavior, including
privacy awareness and perceived data sensitivity. Finally, we considered our find-
ings through the lens of Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) (Rogers, 1983). In
this model, threats and abilities are weighed to determine behavior. The theory
was used to recommend privacy interventions, including risk exposure tools and
protective demonstrations. Our contributions are as follows:
1. Primarily, through an evaluation with 504 smartwatch users, evidence that
privacy-protective behavior can be encouraged.
2. A rare qualitative analysis of the privacy rationale of smartwatch owners.
3. The design and development of, to our knowledge, the first game to address
smartwatch privacy.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the background, includ-
ing previous work, smartwatch features and the assumed threat model. We then
introduce the game in Section 3, highlighting the principles that informed its de-
sign. Section 4 details our research hypotheses, supporting the study procedure in
Section 5. Both our quantitative and qualitative findings are outlined in Section 6.
Finally, Section 7 concludes with contributions, limitations and future work.
2. Background
2.1. Privacy and the Privacy Paradox
Definition. Since privacy is contextual (Nissenbaum, 2009) and subjective
(Palen and Dourish, 2003), people might value it in one environment but not an-
other. To set the context, we scope our work to informational privacy, defined as
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“the interest an individual has in controlling, or at least significantly influencing,
the handling of data about themselves” (Clarke, 1999).
Privacy Paradox. We explicitly define the issue as ‘the disparity between
claimed informational privacy concerns and informational privacy behavior’.
This aligns with Barnes’ original concept (2006): that individuals oppose privacy
invasion and yet share their data widely. Opinion polls (Rainie et al., 2013; Morar
Consulting, 2016) suggest that the public care about their privacy. In a 2017 sur-
vey (Pike et al., 2017), 84% claimed to be worried about their data. 70% of those
surveyed also stated that their concerns had recently increased. However, despite
these assertions, we frequently place our privacy at risk. We avoid policies (Mc-
Donald and Cranor, 2008), ignore permissions (Felt, Ha, Egelman, Haney, Chin
and Wagner, 2012) and rely on lax default settings (Bonneau and Preibusch, 2010).
Keith et al. (2013) studied Privacy Calculus, which compares the risks and bene-
fits of disclosure. In their 1,025-person experiment, they discovered that although
individuals may have intentions, they often fail to act. Acquisti and Gross (2006)
found that even those who expressed reluctance would share data on social net-
works. This is similar to the attitude-behavior gap (Fazio and Roskos-Ewoldsen,
2005) found in psychology research. The disparity is particularly concerning for
privacy, as users might place themselves at risk.
Justifications. Several justifications have been given for the Paradox, includ-
ing cognitive heuristics (Gambino et al., 2016), social representations (Oetzel and
Gonja, 2011) and concern-reward imbalances (Hallam and Zanella, 2017). In
their 2018 work, Bandara et al. (2018) used Construal Level Theory to dissect the
phenomenon. They concluded that privacy is usually perceived as abstract, and
therefore intentions rarely lead to behavior. While Internet-of-Things (IoT) analy-
sis is sparse, Williams et al. (2017) undertook a comparative study. They solicited
the concerns and behavior of the public, comparing the Privacy Paradox across
product categories. They found that smartwatches were most prone to the issue,
with protective features rarely used. Since their participants blamed insufficient
knowledge, privacy instruction appears a logical solution. While these works offer
useful insights, we differ by actively seeking to reduce the Paradox.
2.2. Privacy Behavior Change
Overview. To reduce the Paradox, we must actively adjust privacy behavior.
Previous work suggests the issue can be mitigated by raising awareness. Knowl-
edge is also important, as a person might not recognize they are endangering their
data (Williams et al., 2017). Deuker (2009) attributed the disparity to incomplete
information, bounded rationality and psychological variables. He explained how
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awareness-building could address the first two components, but did not conduct
empirical research. Pötzsch (2009) claimed the Paradox could be reduced through
aligning concern to action or action to concern. Therefore, if we wish to encour-
age protective behavior, we should remind individuals of their trepidation.
Learning interventions have prompted protection, but not in the context of
smartwatches. Albayram et al. (2017) conducted a study of 228 smartphone users,
seeking to incentivize screen locking. After watching an instructive video, their
treatment group reported adjusting their behavior. Albayram et al. (2017) later
analyzed how risk, self-efficacy and contingency influence the use of Two-Factor
Authentication (2FA). They found participants were more willing to try 2FA after
watching a video. We follow the methodological structure of the first study, but
provide novelty through our serious game.
Three-step behavior change. While awareness can highlight risk, behavior is
often not adjusted by providing information (Bada et al., 2015). Sasse et al. (2007)
theorized that change must be delivered through three steps. Attention should first
be drawn to an issue, before learning is provided. Finally, training should be given
to help users refine their behavior. Even if participants then understand protection,
they must also be motivated to act (Bada et al., 2015). Rather than mandating
compliance, user incentives should align with tasks (Renaud et al., 2014). For
example, individuals might feel empowered by taking control of their data.
The above theory has been applied in many privacy studies. Kirlappos and
Sasse (2011) explored how security education might deter phishing. They as-
sessed the efficacy of warning notices, comparing these against signs of reliability.
The authors concluded that effective learning should be driven through the three-
step approach. Furman et al. (2011) also considered security education through
this model. Through their in-depth interviews, they found their participants were
aware of privacy risks. While some even possessed basic knowledge, few had
the skillset to guard their data. Through providing awareness, information and
training, we seek to encourage protective behavior.
Protection Motivation Theory. Within this work, we deconstruct behavior
through Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) (Rogers, 1983). While other mod-
els were considered (including the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) (Fishbein,
1979) and the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) (Ajzen, 1991)), they posed lim-
itations. TRA did not appear suitable, since it does not include behavioral con-
straints or self-efficacy (Briggs et al., 2017). TPB was also deemed insufficient,
as risk is not factored into considerations (Norman and Conner, 1996). We pre-
ferred PMT, which has been recommended for cyber security behavior change
(Briggs et al., 2017). It has also been deemed effective through large-scale meta-
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analysis (Floyd et al., 2000). In PMT, threats (perceived severity and vulnerabil-
ity) and benefits are weighed against coping approaches (response efficacy and
self-efficacy) and response costs. This all contributes to intention, and potentially
behavior. If a risk is perceived and privacy settings are understood, a person might
be expected to act. We seek to highlight these risks while encouraging protection.
This theory has proved successful in previous privacy research. Chenoweth
et al. (Chenoweth et al., 2009) used the model to predict the usage of protec-
tive technologies. They studied how the factors would affect the intention to use
antivirus tools. Through an analysis of 232 participants, response costs and per-
ceived vulnerability appeared to be influential. Another study used PMT to as-
sess how concerns impact protective behavior (Youn, 2009). This was undertaken
through a questionnaire distributed to 144 students. Perceived vulnerability was
most important, though perceived rewards also had significance. In addition to the
above studies, PMT has been used to study behavioral intentions (Anderson and
Agarwal, 2010) and encourage online protection (Shillair et al., 2015a). Although
these works did not explore smartwatches, they align well with our research.
Privacy research. Behavior change has been achieved in non-smartwatch en-
vironments. Egelman et al. (2009) found users were willing to pay for protection
when privacy indicators were provided. The icons highlighted when site policies
conflicted with a person’s preferences. While this technique was successful, the
researchers augmented user interfaces. This approach would be challenging on
proprietary smartwatches. ‘Nudging’ has also proved effective, guiding individu-
als to privacy-conscious decisions (Wisniewski et al., 2016). In a six-week trial,
Wang et al. (2014) studied the influence of nudges on Facebook. When users’
audiences were made salient, unintended disclosure was reduced. Most notably,
nudging has succeeded in mitigating the Paradox. Jackson and Wang (2018) de-
signed personal notifications for mobile apps. Through a 241-person online sim-
ulation, behavior was realigned with intentions. However, rather than evaluating
later actions, this was achieved within a single session. This poses a limitation,
since the efficacy of nudging tends to decrease over time (Voyer, 2015). Fur-
thermore, once this soft paternalism is removed, users often neglect the lessons
(Bruyneel and Dewitte, 2016). This introduces the potential for serious games, as
highlighted below.
2.3. Serious Games
Definition. Serious games are defined as “any form of interactive computer-
based game software...that has been developed with the intention to be more than
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entertainment” (Ritterfeld et al., 2009). We develop what is termed an ‘interven-
tion game’: one that’s primary goal is to encourage behavior change. This aligns
with the terminology used in a wide range of influential applications (Kato et al.,
2008; Huizenga et al., 2009; Lovio et al., 2012; Deriso et al., 2012).
Efficacy. Applications are not a panacea and can suffer from several issues.
Contextualization is challenging, with this limiting the relevance of instruction.
Individuals might also become distracted and overlook the information. Neverthe-
less, apps can aid retention more than conventional instruction methods (Wouters
et al., 2013). Wouters et al. (2013) conducted a meta-analysis, comparing serious
games with traditional instruction. Their evaluation contained 5,547 participants
across 39 studies. Games were found to be significantly more effective for reten-
tion, with this concerning the recall of information after several weeks. Therefore,
with users lacking privacy awareness, this approach appears apt.
Security games. While few games have been developed for smartwatches, re-
lated work is promising. Anti-Phishing Phil (Sheng et al., 2007) taught users how
to avoid phishing campaigns. This online game challenged participants to evade
risky predators. It was found that players became better able to identify fraudulent
websites. The authors (Kumaraguru et al., 2009) also created PhishGuru: a train-
ing application with fake emails. Individuals were targeted through spearphishing
and challenged to avoid the links. Even 28 days after participation, players were
found to retain knowledge. The learning techniques in this application, includ-
ing contextualization and immediate feedback, were adopted in our game. Hale
et al. (2015) built on similar concepts, developing a rich browser simulation.
Users navigated websites and were asked to rate the reliability of content. The
participants successfully identified attacks, whether targeting social networks or
news portals. We also seek to encourage learning through simulated interactions.
NoPhish, developed by Canova et al. 2014, approached the topic in a smartphone
environment. Players were awarded points for protection and penalised for unsafe
decisions. Our application similarly implemented these techniques.
CyberCIEGE (Irvine et al., 2005) did not concern phishing, but taught trainees
how to protect their networks. Through a 3D simulation, users were rewarded
for securing assets and completing objectives. Although it was not evaluated by
its creators, Raman et al. (2014) found trained users outperformed their control
group. Flushman et al. (2015) also considered security, using alternate reality
games (ARGs) to teach university students. After participating, individuals were
seen to act in a more-protective manner. While the aforementioned games were
effective, they all targeted a traditional desktop environment.
Privacy games. Games have also been theorized for privacy instruction. Im-
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maculacy (Suknot et al., 2014) is a proposed interactive story, in which the player
is immersed in a dystopian world. Scores increase based on privacy-protective
decisions, incentivizing users to reflect on their actions. Our application follows
similar principles, rewarding individuals when they configure smartwatch settings.
Barnard-Wills and Ashenden (2015) developed a card game, seeking to highlight
the value of personal data. It was entitled ‘Privacy’ and evaluated on three lev-
els: as a game, as an instructive tool, and as a research aid. While most partic-
ipants reported enjoying the experience, the game did not simulate real interac-
tions. Furthermore, activities were not contextualized within a simulated environ-
ment. These facts do not detract from the content of the game. However, privacy
is contextual (Nissenbaum, 2009) and contextualized apps have been found to be
effective (Steiner et al., 2009). The Open University adapted the game into an
online application1. This app highlighted how data can desired by many entities.
While it possessed rich interactivity, the game has not been empirically evaluated.
Raynes-Goldie and Allen (2014) took a different approach to developing pri-
vacy applications. They constructed ‘The Watchers’, a digitally-augmented board
game. It sought to encapsulate the informational transactions that children expe-
rience. Our application shares similarities, since it encourages practice within a
safe environment. However, we differ by conducting an evaluation of efficacy.
Kumar et al. (2018) sought to co-design privacy games in their 2018 study. They
engaged directly with children to extract recommendations for future apps. These
suggestions included relatable narratives and a variety of privacy consequences.
While Kumar et al. did not evaluate a novel application, we adopt their design
recommendations. ‘Ministry of Sharing’2, developed by the Open University, was
targeted at a broader audience. This app challenged individuals to make disclo-
sure decisions in common scenarios. Based on user actions, they were assigned
privacy classifications. While the game sought to encourage protection, it also
lacks empirical evaluation.
Principles. We designed our game based on techniques from Learning Sci-
ence and HCI. While this work is empirical rather than theoretical, we sought to
root the game on sound principles. These principles, and the literature supporting
their efficacy, are outlined below.
Reinforcement. Positive reinforcement is a common principle used in seri-




where individuals develop a causal relationship between behavior and outcome
(Skinner, 1953). In positive reinforcement, a desirable stimulus is presented as
the consequence of a particular action. Since an individual should favour this out-
come again, they are encouraged to repeat their behavior. Linehan et al. (2011)
outlined empirically-validated guidelines for serious games. They discussed how
the award of in-game points might encourage the repetition of particular actions.
Negative reinforcement is also an effective technique. This approach encour-
ages behavior through the removal of a negative stimulus (Linehan et al., 2011).
For example, an individual losing a game might be forced to restart. This time-
consuming issue might encourage the user to avoid defeat. The technique was
implemented in the Fish‘n’Steps game by Lin et al. (2006). In their applica-
tion, physical activity controlled the development of an animated fish. Negative
reinforcement was used, since a lack of exercise would damage their character.
Through a 14-week study, the authors found their game encouraged activity.
Incentives. To encourage behavior change, incentives are often required. By
aligning new actions with a person’s desires, they should be motivated to act.
As highlighted by Bada et al. (2015), this approach can be more effective than
mandating compliance. They described how campaigns often instruct individuals
to act securely. However, this may be ineffective if users are not motivated.
While Richter et al. (2015) considered gamification, their techniques are ap-
plicable to gameplay environments. They discussed a variety of means in which
new behavior could be encouraged. Indeed, incentives could be driven through
empowerment and social comparison. This might be provided by interactivity
and leaderboards, respectively.
Serious games can encourage actions through intrinsic motivation. This is de-
fined as undertaking an action for its inherent satisfaction (Ryan and Deci, 2000).
For example, a person might play a game purely because it is enjoyable. Extrin-
sic motivation emerges when behavior is driven by an external reward (Ryan and
Deci, 2000). In a gameplay environment, individuals might receive a financial
prize for topping a leaderboard. Breuer and Bente (2010) considered how such
principles could be applied to serious games. They outlined that personalization
and customization were sound approaches to motivate users.
Customization. Customization is an effective principle in serious games (An-
netta, 2010). Applications might appear more engaging when personalized by a
participant. Charsky (2010) described this matter as an ‘expressive choice’. While
the adjustment of traits might not affect the game, it builds empathy between the
player and their character. This should enhance participant engagement, and there-
fore the likelihood of behavior change (Gee, 2003).
9
Some games use avatars to represent the player’s character. This provides
a virtual embodiment of an individual’s actions. The implementation of such a
technique has been found to increase immersion (Annetta and Holmes, 2006). A
less-common approach is to support the customization of this avatar. In a 2008
work, Annetta compared engagement between two personalization approaches
(Annetta, 2008). While some avatars could only toggle between genders, others
could be specified in detail. When the avatar was customized, this resulted in
greater participant satisfaction.
Contextualization. As highlighted earlier, privacy is inherently contextual
(Nissenbaum, 2009). An event deemed invasive on a street might not be excessive
inside a police station. Serious games can also be influenced by the concept of
contextualization. Steiner et al. (2009) considered the importance of grounding
content. They assessed a space-travel app and surmised that “educational game[s]
need to appropriately contextualize learning activities ... to retain [the] flow and
engagement of the gaming experience”.
Context can also be enhanced through the inclusion of Non-Player Characters
(NPCs). These are gameplay avatars that, while interactive, are not controlled by
the participant. Maldonado et al. (2005) studied the influence of such entities in
a 76-person study. Whereas one of their groups did not interact with an NPC, the
other two groups had interactive companions. The authors found that those with
NPCs were significantly more retentive in posttest evaluations.
These characters are valuable in providing feedback; another key component
of serious games. As highlighted by Johnson et al. (2017), feedback is used to
“direct learners to improve performance, motivation, or learning outcomes”. Ke
(2011) conducted a meta-analysis of the approaches underpinning learning games.
In their qualitative evaluation of 89 studies, they concluded that “instructional
support features” are key to such games and should be embedded through “elab-
orative feedback”. Feedback is particularly useful when it can correct undesired
behavior. By providing ‘knowledge of correct results’ (Johnson et al., 2017), par-
ticipants should then be able to better understand their strengths and weaknesses
(Benton et al., 2018).
Novelty. As highlighted above, serious games are considered valuable for
behavior change (Wouters et al., 2013). However, they have rarely targeted the
rapidly-expanding domain of smartwatches.
2.4. Smartwatches and Behavior
Definition. While smartwatches have been prototyped for over a decade (Smith,
2007), they have gained recent consumer popularity. A smartwatch can be defined
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as “an electronic wristwatch that is able to perform many of the functions of a
smartphone” (Collins English Dictionary, 2017).
Behavior. Although few behavioral studies have yet been undertaken, some
have explored interactions in detail. Pizza et al. (2016) used wearable cameras to
analyse smartwatch use. They monitored 12 participants for 34 days, finding their
devices frequently served as timepieces. Notifications also appeared popular, but
privacy features were not explored. Jeong et al. (2017) conducted a longitudinal
study, collecting data on 50 users over 203 days. Although they analyzed device
removal and wear duration, security and privacy were not considered.
Privacy research. While they explored wearables in general, Lee et al. (2016)
studied privacy concerns at a large scale. They surveyed over 1,700 individuals
to understand the issues that provoked the most anxiety. We scope specifically to
smartwatches but use similar privacy scenarios. Ernst and Ernst (2016) investi-
gated how risk perceptions influence smartwatch usage. They surveyed 229 users
and found perceived usefulness increased behavioral intention. Perceived risks
dissuaded participants from interaction, implying they weighed costs against ben-
efits. This suggests that protection might be encouraged by highlighting risks.
Wieneke et al. (2016) came to a similar conclusion in their wearable study.
They conducted interviews with 22 users, finding low awareness of the threats.
Decision-making was deemed to be irrational, and imparting knowledge might
address this issue.
Udoh and Alkharashi (2016) analyzed privacy awareness and smartwatch ac-
tions. Through interviews with 10 students, they found that most did little to pro-
tect their data. Indeed, Rheingans et al. (2016) opined that behavior is driven by
pleasure rather than calculations of utility. Although their survey targeted activity
trackers, wearables were highlighted as ‘hedonic’ technologies.
Due to their advanced functionality, smartwatches can access emails, text mes-
sages, contact details and health recordings (Do et al., 2017). Although privacy
features are available, such as app permissions, it appears such tools are rarely
used (Udoh and Alkharashi, 2016). Our work aims to augment the aforemen-
tioned studies, comparing concerns and behavior at a large scale. Furthermore, in
addition to analyzing the topic, we seek to encourage protective behavior through
our serious game.
Smartwatch games. Smartwatches present a challenging environment, pos-
sessing small screens and few buttons. Indeed, Chun et al. (2018) found these
devices suffer from several usability issues. Casano et al. (2016) did develop
‘Estimate It!’: an app which sought to teach measurement and geometry. It was
assessed by a pool of experts and a 7-person student sample. While users were
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engaged with the gameplay, the interface posed usability challenges. Arroyo et al.
(2016) evaluated their watch game through a pretest-posttest design with 96 stu-
dents. It was found to contribute to a greater enjoyment of mathematics. However,
both these applications were used to augment real-life activities. In contrast, we
seek to address behavior on the smartwatch. Since the public place data at risk,
action must be taken to mitigate the issue.
Critical reflection. While applications might teach protection, games can
also place privacy at risk (Cybulski, 2014). Indeed, covert surveillance has been
proposed through popular platforms such as World of Warcraft (Hope, 2014).
Simulations often track behavior and collect large quantities of data (Hulsey and
Reeves, 2014). Players are routinely monitored while the engine anticipates their
next move (Whitson and Simon, 2014). We recognize this tension and sought to
minimize data collection. Participants were also anonymous and gave informed
consent at the start of the study. Through playing our simulation, individuals
might develop familiarity with smartwatch apps. Since such apps can pose risks
(Schneier, 2015), we accept limitations to our approach. However, we expect the
privacy knowledge to outweigh the negative effects.
3. Game Design
3.1. Overview
Narrative. In our game, (Smart)Watch Out!, players must navigate their char-
acter to a local shop. We selected simple real-world metaphors to align virtual
events to physical risks (Garg and Camp, 2012). En route, players collect coins
to pay for their purchases. Their town is populated by two types of Non-Player
Character (NPC): ‘villagers’ and ‘thieves’. As highlighted in Section 2, these
are included to enhance immersion (Maldonado et al., 2005). ‘Villagers’ ask the
player privacy-related questions, while ‘thieves’ try to violate their privacy. The
thieves trigger challenges, and the game ends if settings are not configured in the
allotted time. Players win by reaching the shop, having successfully overcome the
thieves. Game screenshots can be found in Figure 1.
Mechanics. The online game takes place on a 2D map, similar in style to
Pokémon. Players control the interface like a smartwatch: they click to tap, drag to
swipe and click the side button when required. As previously highlighted, context
can be important for encouraging engagement (Steiner et al., 2009). Therefore,
we sought to simulate the native environment closely.
Players begin by selecting a three-letter name, before configuring their char-
acter. Users can toggle their character’s gender, skin color and hair color. This
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Figure 1: Smartwatch game: Privacy challenge (left), main gameplay (right)
customization was included to enhance engagement (Annetta, 2010), as discussed
in Section 2. Players then navigate their character through the map, interacting
with villagers and thieves.
Questions. Villagers ask privacy questions and reward correct answers with
coins. For example, a person might be asked, “How can I protect my data from
smartwatch thieves?”, and respond with “Enable passcode”. Rather than being
punished for wrong responses, users are given corrective information. We pro-
vided this ‘knowledge of correct results’ to enhance the learning of our partici-
pants (Benton et al., 2018).
Challenges. Thieves trigger privacy challenges, which require players to up-
date the interface’s settings. Users navigate the interface and perform configura-
tion, just as on a real smartwatch. Challenges consisted of enabling a screen lock,
disabling GPS and restricting SMS permissions. For example, a player might go
to Settings  Permissions  BadApp  Revoke SMS to complete the final task.
All questions and challenges corresponded with the protective features, establish-
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ing a relationship between concerns, behavior and gameplay.
Privacy challenges were all time-limited, with health decreasing as this period
elapses. This was used to encourage engagement and incentivise the memoriza-
tion of menu screens. We appreciate that health bars often increase as characters
progress through a game. However, we reward success through coins and use
health to time-limit our challenges. When users encounter a privacy challenge,
they are allowed to decline it. As highlighted in Section 2, incentivization is more
influential than coercion (Bada et al., 2015), and most points are gained through
challenge completion. The faster participants adjust their settings, the more coins
they receive. This positive reinforcement (Kumar, 2013) was included to encour-
age the memorization of the privacy settings.
3.2. Learning Principles
Behavior change. Our game seeks to impart knowledge, with this additional
information leading to behavior change. Therefore, our goals of learning and in-
fluence should not be seen as mutually exclusive. As previously mentioned, Sasse
et al. (2007) theorized that behavior change should be delivered through three
steps. Individuals should be made aware of an issue, then given information, and
then granted opportunities to practice new actions. Our interactive game sought
to follow this approach. The privacy challenges first highlighted potential issues.
Then the questions and feedback provided protective information. Finally, partic-
ipants practiced watch configuration when undertaking the challenges. Based on
task success and failure, a helpful feedback loop was established. By adopting
this detailed approach, we hope to encourage protective behavior.
PMT. We adopted Protection Motivation Theory (PMT), partially due to its
success in security-themed intervention studies (Albayram, Khan and Jensen, 2017).
We seek to emphasize the threat component, highlighting the consequences of
violation and the prevalence of risk. By confronting players with privacy chal-
lenges, we aim to make issues more salient. The benefits of protection are also
explained, as we hope to increase response efficacy. Self-efficacy is crucial, since
it concerns the confidence individuals have in their ability to protect themselves
(Bandura, 1977). Through experimenting on the simulated interface, users should
gain self-belief. Finally, by showing how simple the features are, we aim to reduce
perceived response costs. This holistic approach should encourage protection and
reduce the Paradox.
Platform. The app is defined as an ‘operative game’, in that it “leverages
knowledge gained from the study of games or play to exert control upon the world,
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such as encouraging exercise or learning” (Carter et al., 2014). Rather than host-
ing the app on a single smartwatch, the interface was simulated online. This ap-
proach was chosen for several reasons. Firstly, it allowed us to assess the applica-
tion with a larger and more-diverse sample. Secondly, it also let users experiment
and explore without risking their own devices (Beard, 2010). Finally, it ensured
that the game was presented consistently, rather than on a range of Wear OS mod-
els. While users might feel more engaged on a real smartwatch, our designs can
inform native apps.
Principles. We designed our game based on below techniques from Learning
Science and HCI. While this work is empirical rather than theoretical, we sought
to root the game on sound principles. We implemented the four learning science
principles of goal-oriented, challenging, contextual and interactive (Quinn, 2005).
This was achieved through our (1) privacy tasks, (2) increased difficulty, (3) sim-
ulated interface and (4) game interactivity. We also subscribed to the six princi-
ples of educational game design (Annetta, 2010). This was done through named
avatars (unique identity), the narrative (immersion), user interaction (interactiv-
ity), challenges (increased complexity), scores (informed teaching) and feedback
(instructional). As these techniques informed our app, it had every opportunity to
be influential. While our primary focus was to encourage protection, we hope our
design can inform future smartwatch games.
Game design goals. Through the implementation of PMT principles, our app
sought to encourage protective behavior. To achieve this, we aimed to increase
self-efficacy (through allowing practice), highlight response efficacy (through pro-
viding information), enhance risk perception (through privacy education) and re-
duce perceived response costs (through demonstrating simplicity). Although these
goals were important, they were selected as vehicles of behavior change. If our
game can affect these PMT components, protective actions should result.
3.3. Pilot Testing
To refine our application, we conducted pilot testing through the Prolific crowd-
sourcing service. This platform will be described in greater detail in Section 5.1.
Using a distinct sample from the main study (to avoid learning effects), we re-
cruited 30 users. Participants proceeded through the session in the standard man-
ner by watching an introductory video, playing the game and completing an eval-
uation questionnaire. The materials and procedure is outlined in the next section.
Since demographics are solicited in pretest, these details are not available for pilot
participants. Based on survey results, 60% enjoyed the game, and 60% found it
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usable. This was lower than expected, and fortunately the form solicited qualita-
tive feedback. The most frequent complaints cited difficult controls. In response,
we added an on-screen buttonpad to assist touchscreen users. This refined version
was used in the final study.
4. Research Context and Hypotheses
4.1. Threat Model
Within this work, we analyse the privacy concerns and actions of smartwatch
users. Through this, we explore both behavior change and the Privacy Paradox.
Concerns are relative to their particular context, and therefore it is crucial that we
outline our scope. While an incident might trigger displeasure, that reaction is
irrelevant if the issue lacks feasibility. A threat model describes the risks that are
deemed credible within a particular context (Myagmar et al., 2005).
In our model, we assume individuals own a smartwatch with a number of apps.
App developers legitimately collect data (constrained by permissions) and of-
ten share this (potentially anonymized) data with commercial partners (Schneier,
2015). The watch will have access to GPS, whether natively or synched, allow-
ing the use of navigational features. However, when enabled, this allows real-time
identification of the watch’s location (Ashbrook and Starner, 2003). Smartwatches
are small, valuable and visible. Hence, like most consumer technologies, they
face some risk of loss/theft (Matthews, 2016). Indeed, as expressed by Ricci et al.
(2018), their “size and portability makes them easy to steal”. Based on our model,
we consider privacy threats from tech companies and petty thieves.
4.2. Smartwatch Privacy Features
Since we analyse behavior, it is also wise to highlight the protective features
available. We scoped our focus to Wear OS3 devices, as these products offer
broad privacy functionality. Furthermore, as the smartwatch market is varied,
it was wise to consider a defined ecosystem. Android watches possessed three
relevant features: screen locks, (disabling) GPS and app permissions. Rather than
mandating protective behavior, we sought to encourage users to appreciate the
benefits of privacy. It was crucial to avoid paternalism, and to accept that tools are
3Wear OS, known formally as ‘Wear OS by Google’, was previously branded as ‘Android
Wear’. All these devices support the discussed privacy features. GPS can be native or through a
synched smartphone.
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not necessary in every situation. As will be justified in Section 5.2, behavior was
reported on a Likert Scale from Always to Never.
Screen locks. Wear OS watches currently support screen locks through graph-
ical patterns. While they pose a delay, they reduce the risk a lost device is ac-
cessed. Smartwatches are small, popular, consumer-focused and valuable: the
perfect target for thieves. Screen locks are recommended on phones to mitigate
the theft risk (Consumer Reports, 2014). Since the Android OS is similar on
watches, we expect this threat to also be reduced. Criminals might steal a device
primarily for its hardware value. However, if they can access personal data (e.g.,
text messages, contacts, emails), they could cause additional harm. Therefore,
locks are a first line of defense in keeping data private.
GPS. GPS is beneficial for navigation and sporting activities. But, by def-
inition, it allows a watch’s position to be identified in real time (Ashbrook and
Starner, 2003). Smartwatch tracking might be highly personal, since the sensor
is attached to its owner’s wrist. If an individual spends eight hours at a particular
location, it might be inferred that this is their home or workplace. By combining
pieces of data, a company could build a detailed view of a user’s life (Creese et al.,
2012; Aktypi et al., 2017). We do not call for the complete avoidance of GPS; it
is a key feature of smartwatches. However, by disabling it when not required,
privacy can be protected.
App permissions. Smartwatches can contain sensitive information, from text
messages to contact details (Do et al., 2017). While apps might access these
records legitimately, data is often shared with third-parties (Eadicicco, 2014). For-
tunately, as on smartphones, Wear OS allows users to toggle permissions. If apps
cannot access watch data, they cannot read details or share them further. Although
this can constrain functionality, many users accept permissions without consider-
ing the risks (Felt, Ha, Egelman, Haney, Chin and Wagner, 2012).
4.3. Concerns and Behavior
In this study, we analyse both privacy concern and behavior. However, to
assess the Paradox appropriately, correspondence should exist between our ques-
tions. If a feature does little to assuage a concern, then its usage is irrelevant to
our study. Therefore, to support the principle of compatibility (Ajzen, 1988), we
considered incidents in which tools could reduce a risk. When evaluating privacy
concerns, we solicited responses to privacy scenarios. This popular approach has
been adopted in previous studies of wearable concern (Lee et al., 2016). It also
avoids mentioning the topic, and hence should mitigate priming (Braunstein et al.,
2011). As will be justified in Section 5.2, participants indicated their response
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from Very Pleased to Very Displeased. We now outline the scenarios (data ac-
cess, location tracking and data sharing) and highlight their correspondence with
the protective features.
Data access. As previously mentioned, screen locks should mitigate the risk
of watch theft. Therefore, to gauge concern, participants considered a stranger
accessing their device’s data. These concerns were compared against how con-
sistently a lock was enabled. Users might be opposed to any form of criminality.
However, if data is accessible, further harm can be caused. If a person fears this
incident and yet neglects protection, their behavior might not align with concern.
Location tracking. While GPS offers helpful functionality, it can allow com-
panies to monitor a watch’s location (Troiano, 2016). We asked respondents to
consider this eventuality and provide their reaction. To assess behavior, we so-
licited how often ‘location services’ were used. This term was preferred to ‘GPS’
for comprehensibility. Since usage can place privacy risk (rather than protecting
it), user responses were reverse-coded. Again, we do not call for these services to
be wholly avoided. However, if a person uses GPS while opposing monitoring, a
concern-behavior disparity might exist.
Data sharing. For apps to function, companies legitimately collect watch
data. These details can then be shared with third parties, as is common in the
digital economy (Schneier, 2015). Permission settings are one of the few means of
restricting data collection (Eadicicco, 2014). As a scenario, we asked participants
to consider their personal details being shared. Such concerns were compared
against how often they adjusted their permissions. If a person fears sharing yet
rarely acts, a disparity might be present.
Correspondence. Through our scenarios and protective features, we establish
a conceptual link between concern and behavior. This connection is illustrated
in Figure 2, with concerns denoted by Cs and behavior frequencies denoted by
Bs. The arrows highlight how behavior influences risk, which can then influence
concerns. A negative scenario (e.g., location tracking) might generate concern,
with that concern partially informed by probability and severity. However, actions
might be available (e.g., disabling GPS) which can reduce either the likelihood or
the damage. If a person often uses this protection, it should mitigate the risk. To
examine the Paradox, we compare the degree of concern (C) with the regularity
of protection (B). This approach seeks to ensure the principle of compatibility is
respected (Ajzen, 1988).
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Figure 2: Relationship between privacy concern, risk and behavior
4.4. Hypotheses
As will be outlined in Section 5.3, we analysed the concerns and behavior of
a treatment group (who played the smartwatch game) and a control group (who
did not). They complete questionnaires both prior to the intervention (pretest)
and after this stage (posttest). Ordinal responses were translated into concern
and behavior scores, as outlined in Section 5.2. Through this, we explored the
following six hypotheses.
Concerns. Although data protection is an important topic, it often lacks
salience (Williams et al., 2016a). By highlighting the risks of wearable devices,
privacy threats might appear more tangible. Therefore, we asserted that our treat-
ment group would express greater concerns after gameplay. To ensure the validity
of our study, changes should owe to the game rather than external factors. Thus,
we also assessed our control group responses. We posited that their concerns
should not increase from pretest to posttest. Null hypothesis significance testing
is a matter of continued debate (Nickerson, 2000). However, we do not test for
equivalence; we only care that differences do not reach the significance threshold.
Concerns are measured by mean score, appropriate since Likert responses were
aggregated over related questions (Norman, 2010; Carifio and Perla, 2008).
Behavior. Previous work suggests that risk awareness can promote protec-
tive actions (Deuker, 2009). Through imparting knowledge, we should encourage
users to guard their data. By exploring the frequency of such actions, we can as-
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sess whether behavior has improved. Since behavior change is challenging, and
underexplored on smartwatches, we deem this to be our primary contribution. We
posited that our treatment group would employ protective behaviors more often
after gameplay. We also asserted that this frequency would not increase for our
control group. Behavior is measured by mean score, calculated in a similar man-
ner to the concerns.
Paradox. Since a lack of awareness can contribute to the Privacy Paradox
(Deuker, 2009), information and practice should mitigate the issue. We defined
the Paradox as a 2-point disparity (/5) between the concern and behavior scores.
We did not believe differences of 1 point signaled a dissonance, but thought a
3-point definition was extreme. While we expected concerns to be awoken by
gameplay, we predicted they would increase less than behavior scores. Therefore,
we posited that the disparity would be less prevalent in posttest. If so, this might
suggest that the application can help reduce the Privacy Paradox. We also asserted
that prevalence would not decrease in our control group. This would imply that
our questionnaires did not introduce significant bias.
Research questions. While not falsifiable hypotheses, we conducted qualita-
tive analysis driven by two research questions. Firstly, we wished to explore the
privacy rationale of smartwatch owners. By understanding the decision-making
processes of these individuals, we could explore the impact of our gameplay prin-
ciples. Secondly, since it is unlikely that all participants would be influenced, we
wish to assess why users do not guard their privacy. Through this information, we
seek to inform the development of future interventions.
Summary. In summary, our hypotheses and research questions are:
H1a. The posttest mean concern score of the treatment group will be significantly
higher than its pretest score.
H1b. The posttest mean concern score of the control group will not be signifi-
cantly higher than its pretest score.
H2a. The posttest mean behavior score of the treatment group will be signifi-
cantly higher than its pretest score.
H2b. The posttest mean behavior score of the control group will not be signifi-
cantly higher than its pretest score.
H3a. The posttest Paradox prevalence of the treatment group will be significantly
lower than its pretest prevalence.
H3b. The posttest Paradox prevalence of the control group will not be signifi-
cantly lower than its pretest prevalence.
RQ1. What is the privacy rationale of smartwatch owners?
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RQ2. Why do some smartwatch users not protect their smartwatch privacy?
5. Method
5.1. Participants
Demographics. We screened for adults owning smartwatches, as they could
report their behavior. 504 participants completed the necessary stages, with the
total divided equally between the treatment group and control group. While treat-
ment participants took part in all three stages (including the game session), the
control group completed the pretest and posttest questionnaires. Of the 504 indi-
viduals, 56% were male, 43% were female and 1% identified as non-binary. 73%
were under 36, with an estimated mean age of 31.7. This aligns well with our
target population, since smartwatch users have been noted as disproportionally
male and young (NPD Connected Intelligence, 2014). The sample was also well-
educated, since 63% had at least a degree. This enhances external validity, since
smartwatch owners tend to have higher qualifications (Desarnauts, 2016).
Randomization. One week after the first questionnaire, a randomized half of
our sample participated in the game session. To ensure our randomization was
sufficient, we compared our treatment and control groups. This was important,
as differences in responses could owe to demographics. In this case, it would be
challenging to determine the influence of the game.
We found no significant differences in gender (X2(2) = 2.53, p = .283), age
(U = 30046, p = .262) or education level (U = 31479.5, p = .860). There was
also no difference between the pretest concern scores (U = 28988, p = .070),
behavior scores (U = 30156.5, p = .325) or disparity prevalence (X2(1) = 1.16, p
= .281). We therefore conclude that our groups were sufficiently randomized, and
this should support fair posttest comparisons.
Recruitment. Recruitment was undertaken through the Prolific crowdsourc-
ing service4. We screened for adult smartwatch owners with an approval rating of
at least 90% (the highest filter available). Such filtering is deemed good practice
to maximize the reliability of responses (Peer et al., 2014). While this sample is
not wholly representative of smartwatch users, Prolific has a more-diverse par-
ticipant pool than MTurk (Peer et al., 2017). Prolific members have also been
found to be less dishonest (Peer et al., 2017), reducing the risk of false reporting.
There may be self-selection bias, since individuals chose whether to participate.
4https://prolific.ac/
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But since the surveys did not ostensibly concern privacy, owners should not have
been dissuaded by such issues. At the start, a study link was made visible to the
pool of ∼1,000 valid users. Those who joined (i.e. the participants) completed the
pretest survey and gave informed consent. One week later, half the participants
were randomly allocated to the treatment group. They took part in the game ses-
sion. After a further week, all respondents were sent the final survey. Individuals
were fully informed of their compensation: $1.80 for stage one, $5.20 for stage
two and $1.30 for stage three.
5.2. Materials
Instruments. To evaluate concerns and behavior, we made use of online ques-
tionnaires. This approach was chosen for its suitability to large-sample remote
studies (Evans and Mathur, 2005).
When designing the experiment, we considered using existing instruments.
For example, the Concern for Information Privacy (CFIP) scale (Smith et al.,
1996) has been adopted in many privacy works (Culnan and Armstrong, 1999;
Chellappa and Sin, 2005). Of greatest popularity is the Internet User’s Informa-
tion Privacy Concern (IUIPC) questionnaire (Malhotra et al., 2004). This instru-
ment, which considers control, collection and awareness, seeks to gauge broad
opinions. However, existing scales did not sufficiently capture smartwatch pri-
vacy. Lee et al. (2016) developed a rare form for wearable concerns. Although
their scale was generic, their scenarios focused on headworn devices. Wear OS
behavior is platform-specific and requires specialized questions. Therefore, we
constructed a smartwatch instrument based on Lee et al.’s (2016) work. We also
selected privacy features that were consistently found across these devices. Lee
et al.’s measure was itself adapted from a highly-cited evaluation of smartphone
concerns (Felt, Egelman and Wagner, 2012). With the scale being suitable for
mobile devices, it seemed apt to extend it to smartwatches.
Design. It was important that instruments did not introduce response biases.
To reduce this risk, the queries were carefully refined over several weeks. Further-
more, the same forms were used in pretest and posttest, enabling a fair compar-
ison. Responses can be biased when privacy is primed (Braunstein et al., 2011).
Therefore, we included six decoy questions and shuffled the query sequence. This
should also reduce the risk of response fabrication, as users should not gauge what
answers are expected.
Validation. Once the form was drafted, it received face validation (Collingridge,
2014). This consisted of review by a privacy expert and a psychometrician. The
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former certified that the topic was addressed, while the latter suggested further re-
finements. Finally, we conducted a pilot study with four smartwatch users. They
completed the questionnaire and then discussed their interpretation of the queries.
Since the measure appeared to be understandable, it was then retained for the
real study. This validation process followed the approach of Felt et al.’s (2012)
well-cited concern evaluation.
Overview. The 3-minute form (used in pretest and posttest) was comprised of
demographics, concerns and behavior. These questions are shown below in Table
1 (numbers denote correspondence and privacy queries are italicized).
Table 1: Pretest/Posttest Questionnaire
# Demographics
1 With which gender do you most identify?
[Male, Female, Other]
2 What is your age?
[18-25, 26-35, 36-45, 46-55, 56-65, 66+]
3 What is your highest level of education?
[School/GCSE, A-Level/College, Degree, Masters, PhD]
# Concern Scenarios: Very Pleased, Pleased, Neutral, Displeased, Very Displeased
C1 How would you feel if your watch’s screen became dirty?
C2 How would you feel if a thief viewed all the data on your watch?
C3 How would you feel if your watch’s battery died during the day?
C4 How would you feel if other companies were spying on your watch’s location?
C5 How would you feel if your watch’s apps slowed down?
C6 How would you feel if your watch shared your text messages with another company?
# Behavior Questions: Always, Often, Occasionally, Rarely, Never
B5 How often do you install your watch’s updates?
B6 How often do you disable/refuse the permissions of watch apps?
B1 How often do you clean your watch?
B4 How often do you use location services (GPS) on your watch?
B3 How often do you charge your watch overnight?
B2 How often do you use a passcode/pattern lock on your watch?
Concerns. We solicited concerns by gauging reactions to hypothetical scenar-
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ios. This avoided coarse ratings of ‘privacy’, since the complex topic is not suited
to such evaluations (Paine et al., 2007). Incidents were drawn from the potential
consequences of lax protection. As highlighted in Section 4.3, these were: data
access, location tracking and data sharing. These scenarios were chosen since
such events appeared common in the literature. Responses were made on a five-
point Likert Scale, from Very Pleased to Very Displeased via Neutral. Although
we considered beginning our scale at Neutral, we did not wish to anchor negative
responses. This scale also aligns with the approach taken by Lee et al. (2016).
Behavior. These questions corresponded both with the protective features and
the concern queries. Our chosen actions (enabling screen lock, disabling GPS and
adjusting permissions) should mitigate the privacy risks. In this manner, they seek
to address user concerns. Behavior replies were made on a five-point frequency
scale, ranging from Always to Never. This avoids a coarse binary distinction and
accepts that action might not be consistent. The correspondence between concern
and behavior is key, as studies have been criticized for improper comparisons
(Trepte et al., 2014). With all queries contextualized around an owned device, we
avoided comparing the abstract with the practical.
Rationale. The pretest survey consisted of the aforementioned questions. In
posttest, we also included an extra section of qualitative queries. These questions
were designed and refined in the same manner as above. Again, we searched for
existing measures that could extract privacy rationale. However, none appeared
relevant for the smartwatch context. For example, while health contexts are fre-
quently targeted (Boer and Mashamba, 2005; MacDonell et al., 2013), wearables
are rarely explored. Our queries, found in Appendix A, appeared on the last page
of the online questionnaire. Since page navigation was disabled, earlier responses
should not be affected. This ensures pretest and posttest can be fairly compared.
In this section, we explored why participants might (not) be influenced by the
game. The questions were structured on Protection Motivation Theory, enabling
an analysis of privacy rationale. They also concerned common justifications for
lax behavior. These included users not being informed (unaware), having low self-
efficacy (unconfident), not recognizing the benefits (unconvinced) and not sensing
risk (unconcerned). The rationale questions therefore considered perceived threat,
self-efficacy and response efficacy. If participants are uninfluenced, this might
suggest that gameplay principles have lacked success.
5.3. Procedure
Study stages. Since we wished to compare privacy behavior before and af-
ter the game, we selected a pretest-posttest structure. The approach is summa-
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rized below in Figure 3. It was adapted from the methodology of Albayram et
al. (2017), who successfully encouraged smartphone locking behavior. We used
a similar experimental structure, but evaluated our smartwatch game. While we
considered a crossover design (Watson and Marks, 1971), we had concerns with
this approach. In such repeated-measure experiments, each participant receives
a series of treatments. For example, while one half might receive Intervention
A then Intervention B, the other half would get B before A. Since we sought to
inform users, learning effects might have biased our later stages (Cleophas, 1990).
Figure 3: The three-stage experimental structure
The pretest questionnaire was followed by the game session, followed by the
posttest questionnaire. Participants were not informed of the second survey, in an
attempt to mitigate demand characteristics (Nichols and Maner, 2008). The game
session also included a brief questionnaire, enabling the collection of qualitative
evaluations. We imposed a one-week gap after this stage, as is common in com-
parable studies (Albayram, Khan and Jensen, 2017; Albayram, Khan and Fagan,
2017) and security research (Wiedenbeck et al., 2005; DeWitt and Kuljis, 2006;
Kumaraguru et al., 2009). This was undertaken to explore whether behavioral
lessons were retained. It also sought to reduce priming (Braunstein et al., 2011)
and give participants time to put knowledge into action. Since we screened for
smartwatch owners, users should be able to continue their experimentation. Study
purpose was disguised, participation was anonymous and compensation was allo-
cated equally. Therefore, we mitigated many incentives to falsify behavior. The
study also received ethical approval from our institution’s IRB prior to conduction.
We used treatment and control groups, with this design known to combat
confounding variables (Shuttleworth, 2010). The treatment condition played the
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game, while the control group took no action. Both groups completed all pretest
and posttest questionnaires, enabling the comparison of responses. The average
completion times were 3.45, 37.63 and 6.13 minutes for stages one, two and three,
respectively. Since these means are in excess of the compensated durations (3, 25
and 4), we deemed participants to have invested sufficient effort.
Game session. In stage two, we did not seek to dictate actions or reduce a par-
ticipant’s agency. Instead, we provided users with information and an opportunity
to trial new behavior. The session consisted of three components. Participants
were first shown a brief video. It introduced the game and outlined the mechanics
of the privacy challenges. It also demonstrated how to use the interface, seeking
to minimize usability issues. The video page can be found in Figure 4. Partici-
pants then played the serious game for five minutes. This allowed them to learn
new skills and practice protective techniques. Finally, individuals completed a
brief questionnaire to evaluate the game. In the interest of brevity, these results
are not discussed. There was a risk that participants would complete the session
questionnaire while skipping the other components. To combat this, visual codes
were embedded within the video and the game. To demonstrate their participation,
individuals were required to report these codes.
5.4. Analysis
Quantitative. Since our Likert data was not normally distributed, we opted for
non-parametric techniques. We used Spearman’s Rank (rs) to assess correlation
between our ordinal variables (Spearman, 1904). For significance testing inde-
pendent samples, we performed the Mann-Whitney U Test (Mann and Whitney,
1947). This was selected when our dependent variables were ordinal and the in-
dependent variables were nominal. For testing two related samples, the Wilcoxon
Signed-Rank Test was preferred instead (Wilcoxon, 1945). When the dependent
variables were nominal, we made use of the Chi-Squared Test (X2) (Pearson,
1900). For repeated measures with such nominal variables, we opted for the Mc-
Nemar Test (McNemar, 1947). As convention, x̄ denotes means and σ indicates
standard deviation.
Qualitative. Through our posttest questionnaire, we received a rich set of
qualitative responses. For such data, we conducted an inductive process of frame-
work analysis (Ritchie et al., 2003). This approach bears similarity to thematic
analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006), but is “not bound by a particular epistemolog-
ical position, giving it freedom and flexibility” (Parkinson et al., 2016). We opted
for an inductive process as we sought to avoid bias from latent assumptions (Boy-
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Figure 4: Introductory smartwatch video
atzis, 1998). Although we considered our findings in line with PMT, we ensured
coding was data-driven and not moulded to this model.
As a first stage, we familiarized ourselves with the data. The text was read
and re-read, enabling initial patterns to be noted. To ensure the richest of analy-
ses, this approach was undertaken for all 504 participants. For the second phase,
we annotated responses with high-level labels. Similar codes were then collated,
resulting in general themes (stage three). For example, ‘Not aware’ and ‘Low
risk awareness’ were coalesced into ‘Lack of awareness’. This sought to establish
consistent categories across an entire dataset. As a fourth stage, these themes were
developed into coding indices. Each index sought to structure responses in a hier-
archical and consistent manner. For categorization, these indices then formed our
coding frames (stage five). To increase the robustness of this process, we devel-
oped strict definitions for each theme. As a final stage, responses were categorized
and used to inform our conclusions. We also chose vivid examples to serve as in-
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teresting extracts (Braun and Clarke, 2006). This allowed us to showcase those
participant remarks which exemplify a theme.
6. Results and Discussion
6.1. Concerns, Behavior and the Privacy Paradox
In the interest of brevity, we primarily focus on final responses and pretest-
posttest comparisons. This highlights our central contribution: evaluating whether
protective behavior can be encouraged. One week after the game session, we
distributed the posttest questionnaires to both groups. It should also be noted
that current behavior was requested rather than behavioral intent. This enabled
exploration of whether protective actions had increased in frequency.
Concerns. Across both groups, 93% expressed posttest opposition to the data
access scenario. This was represented by a mean response of 4.60 (σ = 0.843),
with the scale ranging from Very Pleased (1) to Very Displeased (5). Based on
these metrics, users seem to value their watches. Concern appeared to significantly
increase in the treatment group (Z = -2.04, p = .042, d = 0.13). Since the game
highlighted the potential consequences, individuals might now recognize the risks.
Location tracking also proved unpopular, with 90.7% signaling their displea-
sure (x̄ = 4.50, σ = 0.855). Participants appear to reject the notion of technological
monitoring. This provides an interesting contrast to the commonality of location-
based services. Despite the gameplay session, responses failed to significantly
differ from the pretest percentage (92%, x̄ = 4.56, σ = 0.780). When apprehen-
sion is near-maximal, it is challenging to enhance concerns.
Grievances over data sharing appeared to slightly reduce, though the change
was not significant. 96% were (at least) displeased in pretest (x̄ = 4.75, σ = 0.667),
suggesting this was the most-concerning incident. Again, these results are in ten-
sion with the realities of the online economy (Schneier, 2015). This concern de-
creased to 93.1% after the game session (x̄ = 4.65, σ = 0.834). Since the treatment
group learned protective techniques, perhaps some felt better prepared.
We then examined our first hypothesis (H1a), analysing whether the treatment
group’s concern score had significantly increased. We found no significant dif-
ference between pretest and posttest metrics (H1a: Reject, p = .544). This was
counter to our expectations and might indicate that worries are near a maximum.
We then explored H1b, positing that the control concern score would not increase.
Since they did not differ (H1b: Accept, p = .814), our questionnaires should not
have introduced significant bias.
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Behavior. We now consider behavior, assessing whether our game proved
influential. Prior to gameplay, screen locks were used often by 57%. This re-
sulted in a sample-wide mean of 3.37 (σ = 1.694), with the scale ranging from
Never (1) to Always (5). This suggested that many users did little to protect their
smartwatches. Encouragingly, usage significantly increased (Z = -3.54, p < .001,
d = 0.22) in the treatment group (64%, x̄ = 3.66, σ = 1.632). If individuals now
recognize the risk, they might appreciate the protection.
By disabling GPS, individuals can limit the threat of location monitoring
(Rahman, 2013). Although the tracking scenario was strongly opposed, partic-
ipants seem to enjoy the service. In pretest, only 23% of our sample used GPS
rarely (x̄ = 2.64, σ = 1.197). This was compared to the 51% who enabled it of-
ten. The treatment group then had opportunities to practice protective behavior.
However, their GPS usage failed to significantly change (x̄ = 2.68, σ = 1.094).
Individuals might recognize the risks but still opt for functionality benefits (Lee
et al., 2013). This is a valid response, provided users make informed decisions.
Finally, we considered the usage of smartwatch app permissions. Before the
game session, these settings were often checked by 24% of participants (x̄ = 2.82,
σ = 0.975). Since loose permissions allow functionality, sharing might have been
common. After playing the game, treatment-group usage significantly increased
(Z = -3.65, p < .001, d = 0.23) to 32% (x̄ = 3.11, σ = 1.027). While this remains
a minority, it is promising that protection was encouraged. If the risks of sharing
can be demonstrated, perhaps users will adjust their behavior.
Our third hypothesis, H2a, asserted that the treatment group’s behavior score
would significantly increase. This was found to be true, with these participants
taking greater action (H2a: Accept, x̄ = 3.32, σ = 0.83, Z = -4.40, p < .001,
d = 0.28). Such results support our central contribution: that our game might
encourage protective behavior. This might encourage the further development of
privacy apps. H2b was then examined, which posited that the control behavior
score would not increase. Since it failed to differ significantly (H2b: Accept, p =
.150), the questionnaires should not have biased responses.
Pretest Paradox. To assess the Privacy Paradox, we compared participants’
concerns with their behavior. Before users played the game, a disparity appeared
to be prevalent. For screen lock protection, respondents’ behavior scores were sig-
nificantly less than their concern scores (Z = -12.43, p < .001, d = 0.85). While
they might want protection, the action might be deemed inconvenient. When con-
sidering location tracking, behavior scores were also lower than concern scores
(Z = -17.39, p < .001, d = 1.31). Again, users might have appreciated the func-
tionality without gauging the risks. Finally, the same concern-behavior disparity
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was found for permissions (Z = -18.10, p < .001, d = 1.39). Many individuals
might genuinely oppose this scenario. However, they might have little awareness
of when data is accessed.
Across the three features, individuals acted significantly less privacy-conscious
than their concerns (Z = -18.60, p < .001, d = 1.45). This large effect size sug-
gests a disparity might be present. A concern-behavior heatmap is found below in
Figure 5, with the white line denoting the Paradox. It illustrates how participants
were largely concerned, yet protection was inconsistent. Based on our 2-point
definition, 43.3% (218/504) were potentially susceptible to the issue. This echoes
Williams et al. (2017) in suggesting the Paradox is prevalent for smartwatches.
Figure 5: Distribution of pretest privacy concerns and behavior
Posttest Paradox. We can assess the Paradox through two techniques. In the
first, we consider prevalence: the quantity of (at least) 2-point disparities. This
analyzes how common the issue is in a group of individuals. In the second, we
measure magnitude: the gap between concern and behavior scores. This assesses
the extent to which the components diverge.
To explore H3a, we analyzed whether the Privacy Paradox decreased in the
treatment group. The Paradox was indeed both less prevalent (H3a: Accept,X2(2)
= 17.58, p < .001, V = 0.19) and reduced in magnitude (Z = -3.58, p < .001, d =
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0.23). While 45.6% were prone in pretest, this decreased to only 29.4%. While
the game is not a panacea, it appears to successfully mitigate the issue.
We then considered H3b, which posited that Paradox prevalence would not
decrease in the control group. In this case, neither the prevalence nor magnitude
significantly decreased (H3b: Accept, p = .801 and p = .345). 40.9% were prone
in pretest, and 39.7% continued to be afterwards. The control group served its
purpose, since extraneous variables appeared to have little influence. Therefore,
our game might have mitigated the Privacy Paradox. Even if partially effective,
such apps could provide a complement to awareness campaigns. In Figure 6, we
present the prevalence across both groups. While the treatment group (randomly)
began with more instances, it removed far more through the study.
Figure 6: Privacy Paradox prevalence throughout the study
While our quantitative findings are enlightening, we move on to consider pri-
vacy rationale. With few studies conducted of smartwatch owners, this grants a
rare opportunity to examine their views.
6.2. Behavioral Rationale
The posttest questionnaire also included qualitative queries, enabling a dis-
section of rationale. Participant responses were coded through inductive analysis,
ensuring our findings were data-driven (Boyatzis, 1998). Following coding, we
considered the response ratios through Protection Motivation Theory (PMT). This
was used to explore why participants did (or did not) change their behavior. By
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understanding the game’s strengths and weaknesses, we can assess the influence
of our principles. We can also then inform the development of future applications.
Self-efficacy. We first asked users if they believed they understood protec-
tion, testing whether they felt informed. This assessed both self-efficacy and the
learning aspects of our game. 75% of the treatment group answered in the affir-
mative, significantly more than in the control group (X2(2) = 42.00, p < .001, V
= 0.29). This suggests that the app was successful in imparting knowledge. When
asked why, 26% of treatment participants said they had now taken action. Of
those who did not understand, 44% felt under-informed and 11% deemed it too
complex. This indicates that existing approaches are not a panacea for increasing
skills. Our game did not include large quantities of information (to keep gameplay
engaging), but the content could be increased if necessary. Representative quotes,
along with the participant number, are shown below:
“I work in IT and have a good knowledge of data protection” (#47, Do you
understand? - Yes).
“I’ve never kept myself informed about it so I don’t think I know how” (#196,
Do you understand? - No).
To further assess self-efficacy, we asked users whether they felt confident they
could protect themselves. If so, this indicates that they feel prepared, even if this
confidence is misplaced. 64% of the treatment group responded ‘Yes’, again sig-
nificantly more than in the control group (X2(2) = 21.78, p < .001, V = 0.21). As
expected, this suggests the game encouraged greater confidence. Of those answer-
ing in the affirmative, 29% said they had now taken action. Of those responding
‘No’, 36% reported insufficient knowledge and 24% thought adversaries were too
skilled. Such views could lead to ‘privacy fatalism’, with users failing to invest the
effort. In response, it might help to showcase the limits to hackers’ capabilities.
“I passcode the watch and disable certain features” (#335, Are you confident
that you can protect your smartwatch? - Yes).
“I think that there are much smarter hackers out there than me” (#206, Are
you confident that you can protect your smartwatch? - No).
Response costs. Individuals have previously doubted whether privacy is worth
the effort (Williams et al., 2017). While protection is desirable, often it is traded
for convenience or short-term necessity. Therefore, we asked our sample whether
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they believed the benefits outweighed the bother. This sought to gauge the re-
sponse costs of protection; another PMT component. 86% of the treatment group
agreed, compared to 82% of control participants. The proportions failed to differ,
and this component appears in little need of attention. Curiously, those answer-
ing ‘Yes’ were significantly less likely to display the Paradox (X2(2) = 6.05, p =
.049, V = 0.11). This suggests that we should advertise privacy benefits, particu-
larly since its intangibility can limit salience (Jackson et al., 2005). Of those who
judged little benefit, 40% believed their data was innocuous. Therefore, revised
applications could focus on the inferences possible from apparently-trivial data
(Creese et al., 2012).
“Protection always better than cure, so it is well worth the effort” (#19, Is
privacy worth the effort? - Yes).
“I don’t see why anyone would care about my personal smartwatch data”
(#226, Is privacy worth the effort? - No).
Perceived threat. To gauge the perceived threat, one half of the PMT model,
we asked users whether they felt at risk. Only 32% of the control group agreed,
significantly less than the 49% of treatment participants (X2(2) = 15.27, p < .001,
V = 0.18). Again, this suggests that the game was influential in adjusting behav-
ioral rationale. However, still over half of our treatment group doubted the threat.
In refined versions, threats will be given greater emphasis. Of those who perceived
an issue, 20% blamed sophisticated hackers. Of those doubting the threat, 31%
thought their smartwatch was innocuous. Since many undervalue their data, this
encourages the signposting of inference capabilities.
“People can steal information that others wouldn’t think is important” (#181,
Are you under threat? - Yes).
“I’ve got nothing worth spying on” (#268, Are you under threat? - No).
6.3. Suggested Further Remediation
For those participants who played the game, the Privacy Paradox became less
prevalent. However, many users continued to act less privately than their concerns
might warrant. Therefore, we analyzed the justifications given by those who still
displayed a disparity. Through examining responses to our PMT queries, we re-
fined recommendations for future approaches.
33
Protective feature demonstration. Of those displaying a disparity, 56.3%
still claimed to understand protection. The most frequent justification (30.6%)
for this was that they possessed technical expertise. This suggests that many are
aware of protective features, but choose not to act. In these cases, they likely fail
to perceive a privacy risk. While these users might be hard to convince, at least
they possess technical understanding. If their risk exposure can be highlighted,
it might trigger protective behavior. Of those who did not understand, 62.0% ex-
pressed that they were insufficiently informed. Some of these would have played
the game, indicating that apps are not a panacea. For such users, feature demon-
strations might be a wise approach.
Only 48.3% of disparity-prone users were confident in protecting themselves.
61.1% of these blamed a lack of information, implying that further content must
be provided. If doubts stem from insufficient knowledge, we recommend demon-
strations to showcase privacy-protecting features (e.g., app permissions). These
videos could be embedded within our serious game, centralising the information
in a single location. By watching demonstrations of smartwatch configuration,
unsure individuals should gain self-efficacy. The success of such measures could
be ascertained through follow-up challenges and questions. If users can navigate
menus after viewing this content, the games might have imparted knowledge.
Highlight risk exposure. Even of those expressing the Paradox, 79.9% claimed
privacy was worth the effort. Over 30% of those valued its protection, while most
negative respondents doubted sensitivity. It seems that individuals will voice their
support for privacy, even if they fail to act. This supports the view that social
norms contribute to the disparity (Blank et al., 2014). If we highlight the actual
risk, users might follow up on their claims.
When asked if they felt under threat, 39.7% of disparity-prone users responded
‘Yes’. This small proportion was expected, as individuals are unlikely to act if they
feel secure. Again, the most-popular justification was a perceived lack of data
sensitivity (37.1%). Of those who did feel under threat, over 40% blamed hackers
and their techniques. This creates an intriguing contrast: some users think their
data is innocuous, while others believe they are vulnerable. Again, this suggests
that we should inform individuals of criminals’ capabilities (Nurse, 2018).
Our prototype game was web-based and hence could not assess installed ap-
plications. In updated versions, we could incorporate risk evaluations. The game
would sit directly on the smartwatch, enabling the monitoring of apps and be-
havior. It might then distinguish sensitive data from trivial details, helping users
manage the threat. Based on current settings, the game could deduce the infer-
ences and include these within privacy challenges. Such an approach might both
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demonstrate capabilities and enhance the realism of the game. To examine our
success, watch settings could be assessed over time. If individuals begin restrict-
ing their permissions, they might have learned to value protection.
6.4. Results Summary
Findings. Prior to gameplay, privacy-protective behavior was far from con-
sistent. In pretest, less than 60% used passwords often, while permissions were
accessed rarely. Despite this lack of action, participants claimed to be concerned
about their privacy. After playing our game, treatment-group behavior became
more protective. Indeed, their usage of both screen locks and permissions signif-
icantly increased. This appeared to mitigate the Privacy Paradox. In contrast, the
behavior of the control group did not significantly adjust. This suggests that our
intervention game might have proved influential.
Principles. Through qualitative questions, we then assessed the efficacy of
our principles. We sought to enhance self-efficacy by providing participants with
protective knowledge. This appeared successful, since our treatment group were
both more confident and claimed greater understanding (than the control group).
Our game also aimed to highlight the ease of protection, since response costs are
a key factor. Again, treatment participants were more likely to believe privacy
was worth the effort. Finally, we assessed whether individuals felt their data was
under threat. As the treatment group were more convinced, our game might have
enhanced their threat perception.
Enhancements. While many participants adjusted their behavior, others did
not. This suggests that the game could benefit from further development. Of those
still prone to the Privacy Paradox, a large proportion believed they were insuffi-
ciently informed. Many also lacked confidence in protection, again justified by a
lack of knowledge. To address this, the game could be enhanced through an em-
bedded video. Through demonstrations of behavior, users should gain familiarity
with guarding their watches.
Although most believed that privacy was worth it, many deemed their data in-
nocuous. Similarly, when queried on their threat perception, some participants
thought the risk was low. It is possible that these users are not aware of ad-
vanced inference techniques. To enhance our game, we could adapt gameplay
based on installed applications. By highlighting each participant’s risk exposure,
they might be persuaded to update their settings.
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7. Conclusions
Contributions in context. Our work suggests that the Privacy Paradox can be
actively mitigated. This has great implications for both research and industry. Pre-
vious studies have highlighted the importance of increasing awareness (Pötzsch,
2009; Deuker, 2009). However, since public campaigns can lack efficacy (Sasse
et al., 2007), it was unclear whether mitigation was feasible. Through impart-
ing knowledge and incentivising action, the Paradox was successfully reduced.
Therefore, while the issue appears to defy rationality (Acquisti and Grossklags,
2005), it is far from intractable. Our research has also demonstrated the poten-
tial of smartwatch games. Few wearable apps have yet targeted this environment
(Casano et al., 2016; Arroyo et al., 2016). However, the interface appears to be
sufficiently rich. We adapted techniques from Learning Science, and we offer
(Smart)Watch Out! as a foundation for future applications.
The technology industry might also be affected by Paradox mitigation. Many
companies currently base their business models on data collection (Schneier, 2015).
Until now, even when consumers express privacy concerns, they fail to use pro-
tection. This allowed vendors to defend their practices as tacitly accepted (Bösch
et al., 2015). With the growth of the Internet-of-Things, data collection appears
set to increase (Perera et al., 2015). Smart devices are often cheap and obsolescent
(Schneier, 2015), reducing incentives for security protection. This environment is
considered likely to foster the Paradox (Williams et al., 2016b). However, if learn-
ing techniques can realign behavior with concern, users might gain greater agency.
Conversely, research provides several opportunities for tech companies. Smart-
watch interfaces continue to be constrained and unfamiliar (Chun et al., 2018).
But games appear successful in teaching platform navigation. Future apps could
target non-privacy topics, such as installing apps or configuring settings.
By actively mitigating the Paradox, our work offers a novel contribution. Groom
and Calo (2011) proposed a study to realign behavior with concerns. However, it
is unclear whether the experiment was ever conducted. Jackson and Wang (2018)
did mitigate the issue in their smartphone nudging work. But whereas they re-
aligned behavior on a single date, we considered actions over a two-week period.
Furthermore, the Paradox has not been previously explored within smartwatch
environments. As these devices grow in sophistication and popularity, privacy
research will become increasingly important.
Our results compare favourably with non-game privacy interventions. LaRose
and Rifon (2007) used warnings and seals to highlight the risk of interactions.
When the issues were communicated, participants were significantly less likely
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to disclose. However, since their sample was smaller and student-composed, it
has limitations in external validity. Similar to our work, Shillair et al. (2015b)
developed an intervention based on Protection Motivation Theory. They assessed
the influence that salient responsibility would have on behavior. While their ap-
proach increased self-efficacy, it did not result in enhanced privacy. Our game
had similar success to ‘Cyberheroes’: an interactive e-book developed by Zhang-
Kennedy et al. (2017). The application highlighted the risks of digital footprints
and online interactions. Although protection was encouraged for one week, it was
only evaluated by 44 participants. Our work was trialled in detail by 504 smart-
watch users. Finally, Archer et al. (2014) assessed the influence of instructional
videos. Through their 80-person study, they found the intervention led to settings
configuration. While our research had similar success, we analysed behavior over
a greater period of time.
Despite our promising findings, we accept that games do not provide a panacea.
Hays (2005) conducted an extensive literature review of instructional applications.
While games had the capacity to impart information, there was no evidence they
were the preferred solution. In future work, we wish to compare our app’s influ-
ence with that of other techniques. Wouters et al. (2013) highlighted that games
are often assumed to be motivational. However, they found enthusiasm failed to
differ between this approach and traditional instruction. If games are to achieve
success, they must be appreciated by their users. Of particular concern is the rel-
ative scarcity of empirical evaluations (Tobias et al., 2011). While many apps
are developed, few are assessed for their behavioral influence. We call for the
conduction of intervention studies, much like our own research.
Summary. As our primary contribution, we explored whether protective be-
havior could be encouraged through a smartwatch game. Individuals completed
privacy challenges on a simulated interface, directly practicing protective actions.
The application was refined in a pilot study and directly informed by Learning
Science principles.
To assess its influence, we solicited the concerns and behavior of 504 smart-
watch owners. Half of these users played the game (treatment group), while the
other half did not (control group). Protective behavior became significantly more
frequent in the former group, with the Privacy Paradox significantly reduced. The
control group did not differ throughout the study, implying that extraneous vari-
ables were minimized. These results suggest that privacy protection can be en-
couraged, and provide support to future privacy apps.
To gain insight into participants’ rationale, we also solicited qualitative re-
sponses. Behavior deviated from concerns for several reasons, including data
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sensitivity, social norms and ideology. We concluded our work by distilling rec-
ommendations for future privacy interventions. These approaches were informed
by Protection Motivation Theory. Tools should be demonstrated, risk exposure
should be highlighted and ‘user-based penetration testing’ should be considered.
Through these techniques, behavior might be realigned with concerns.
Limitations and future work. While we stand by our findings, we accept
several limitations. Firstly, our interface was simulated rather than hosted on a
smartwatch. This might have reduced its usability and potential for influence.
However, this remote approach enabled large-scale analysis with a varied demo-
graphic. We are developing serious Wear OS apps, and they will be informed by
these findings. Secondly, due to the online nature of our study, behavior was re-
ported. While empirical data is preferable, top-tier studies frequently adopt this
approach (Albayram, Khan and Jensen, 2017; Coventry et al., 2014; Staddon et al.,
2012). We sought to limit the risk of fabrication through ensuring anonymity,
mitigating priming and allocating compensation equally. Participants from Pro-
lific have also been found to be less dishonest than those on competing platforms
(Peer et al., 2017). Since privacy was disguised in the surveys, this further miti-
gated the Hawthorne Effect (Adair, 1984). In future research we wish to conduct
field studies, informed by our findings.
Thirdly, although our privacy measures were carefully devised, they did not
receive statistical validation. Informed by our study’s results, we plan to refine
and validate the privacy questionnaires. Since these measures were reviewed and
piloted before our experiment, we believe they still proved valuable. Finally, while
one-week pauses are common in security research (Albayram, Khan and Jensen,
2017; Zhang-Kennedy et al., 2017; Wiedenbeck et al., 2005; DeWitt and Kuljis,
2006; Kumaraguru et al., 2009), we accept that retention was not extensively as-
sessed. Individuals might retain knowledge and behavior for a month, before
returning to their old habits. As further work, longitudinal studies should explore
whether games are influential over a greater period of time.
Despite these limitations, we developed the first game to concern smartwatch
privacy. Through a large-scale evaluation, it appeared to encourage user protec-
tion. We also achieved the rare feat of mitigating the Privacy Paradox. As smart
devices proliferate through our societies, it is crucial that privacy is supported.
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Appendix A. Posttest Rationale Questions
Table A.2: Posttest Rationale Questions
# Question
1 In which way do you believe you learn most effectively?
[Visually, Aurally, Verbally, Physically, Unsure]
2 Do you think you understand how to protect your smartwatch data? Why?
[Yes, No, Unsure]
3 Do you feel confident that you can protect your smartwatch data? Why?
[Yes, No, Unsure]
4 Do you think taking action to protect your smartwatch data is worth the effort? Why?
[Yes, No, Unsure]
5 Do you think your smartwatch data faces a realistic threat? Why?
[Yes, No, Unsure]
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